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Abstract
This study reports on an implementation of cryptographic pairings in a general purpose
computer algebra system. For security levels equivalent to the different AES flavours, we
exhibit suitable curves in parametric families and show that optimal ate and twisted ate
pairings exist and can be efficiently evaluated. We provide a correct description of Miller’s
algorithm for signed binary expansions such as the NAF and extend a recent variant due
to Boxall et al. to addition-subtraction chains. We analyse and compare several algorithms
proposed in the literature for the final exponentiation. Finally, we give recommendations
on which curve and pairing to choose at each security level.
1 Pairings on elliptic curves
In this article, we treat cryptographic bilinear pairings G1 × G2 → GT on elliptic curves E
deﬁned over some ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq of characteristic p. We emphasise that our aim is not to set new
speed records for particular curves, cf. [2, 20, 1], but to compare diﬀerent choices of pairings
and parameters at various security levels, using a general purpose, but reasonably optimised,
implementation in a general purpose computer algebra system. Such an analysis will be mean-
ingful assuming that the ratios between the various operations remain constant when switching
to hand-optimised assembly implementations in each instance.
We ﬁx the following standard notations and setting. Let E(Fq) denote the Fq-rational points
on E, and let r be a prime divisor of #E(Fq) = q + 1 − t that does not divide q − 1, where
t is the trace of Frobenius. Let the embedding degree k be the smallest integer such that r
divides qk − 1, and denote by π the Frobenius map E(Fqk) → E(Fqk), (x, y) 7→ (xq, yq). The
r-torsion subgroup E[r] is deﬁned over Fqk , and it contains the non-trivial subgroup E(Fq)[r] of
Fq-rational r-torsion points. Denote by µr the subgroup of r-th roots of unity in F
∗
qk .
Typically, GT = µr, G1 = E(Fq)[r], and G2 is a subgroup of order r of either E[r] or of
E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk ).
1.1 Functions with prescribed divisors
Let E be given over Fq by an equation in the variables x and y. For a rational function f ∈
Fq(E) := Fq(x)[y]/(E) and a point P ∈ E, denote by ordP (f) the positive multiplicity of the
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zero P of f , the negative multiplicity of the pole P of f , or 0 if P is neither a zero nor a pole
of f . Denote by div(f) =
∑
P ordP (f)[P ] the divisor of f , an element of the free abelian group
generated by the symbols [P ], where P is a point on E.
The deﬁnition and computation of pairings involve certain rational functions with given di-
visors, in particular, fn,P with
div(fn,P ) = n[P ]− [nP ]− (n− 1)[O],
the lines ℓP,Q through two (not necessarily distinct) points P and Q with
div(ℓP,Q) = [P ] + [Q] + [−(P +Q)]− 3[O]
and the vertical lines vP through a point P with
div(vP ) = [P ] + [−P ]− 2[O].
All these functions are deﬁned up to a multiplicative constant, and they are normalised at inﬁnity
by the condition
(
f
(
Y
X
)ordO(f))
(O) = 1.
In particular, we have ℓP,−P = vP , f1,P = 1 and f−1,P = 1/vP .
The function fn,P is of degree O(n) and may be evaluated in O(log n) steps by the algorithms
of §3.
1.2 Cryptographic pairings
We quickly recall the main cryptographic pairings. In applications, they are usually restricted
to E(Fq)[r] in one argument and to a subgroup of order r in the other argument.
Weil pairing
eW : E(r) × E(r)→ µr, (P,Q) 7→ (−1)r fr,P (Q)
fr,Q(P )
Computing the pairing requires the evaluation of two functions; moreover, with P ∈ E(Fq) and
Q ∈ E(Fqk), the function fr,Q is much costlier to evaluate by the algorithms of §3.
Tate pairing
eT : E(Fq)[r]× E(Fqk)/rE(Fqk ) → F∗qk/(F∗qk)r ≃ µr,
(P,Q) 7→ fr,P (Q) ↔ fr,P (Q)(qk−1)/r.
The pairing requires only one evaluation of a rational function, but the original deﬁnition with a
quotient group as domain is unwieldy since there is no easy way of deﬁning unique representatives.
The ﬁnal exponentiation step of raising to the power q
k−1
r realises an isomorphism with µr, and
the resulting pairing is usually called the reduced Tate pairing.
Ate pairing By restricting its arguments to the two eigenspaces of E[r] under the Frobenius
with eigenvalues 1 and q, respectively, the ate pairing introduced in [14] replaces fr,P (Q) with
r ∈ O(q) by fT,Q(P ), where T = t − 1 ∈ O(√q). This saving may be oﬀset by the swap of
arguments P and Q, so that the function is deﬁned over Fqk instead of Fq.
eA : E(Fq)[r] × E[r] ∩ ker(π − q)→ µr, (P,Q) 7→ fT,Q(P )(q
k−1)/r.
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Twisted ate pairing The curve E admits a twist of degree d = gcd(k,#Aut(E)); let e = k/d.
The twisted ate pairing of [14] works again with a function over Fq, at the expense of a factor of
O(e) in its evaluation:
eA′ : E(Fq)[r]× E[r] ∩ ker(π − q)→ µr, (P,Q) 7→ fT e,P (Q)(q
k−1)/r.
Optimal pairing Generalisations of the ate and twisted ate pairings requiring several functions
for their evaluation have been given in [13, 23]. All of them take G1 = E(Fq) and G2 =
E[r]∩ker(π−q). They are evaluated with low degree functions, typically requiring O(log r/ϕ(k))
operations (not counting the ﬁnal exponentiation), where ϕ is Euler’s function.
Let λ = mr =
∑n
i=0 λiq
i be a suitably chosen multiple of r with r ∤ m such that the λi are
small; more precisely, one requires a short addition-subtraction sequence passing through all λi.
An optimal ate pairing is obtained by
eO : G1 ×G2 → µr, (P,Q) 7→
(
n∏
i=0
f q
i
λi,Q
(P )
n−1∏
i=0
ℓsi+1Q,λiqiQ(P )
vsiQ(P )
)(qk−1)/r
,
where si =
∑n
j=i λjq
j . Since λ = ϕk(q) yields a degenerate pairing, one may assume n < ϕ(k);
a precise condition for non-degeneracy is given in [23, Th. 4]. Finding such a multiple of r with
small coeﬃcients in base q is a common integer relation problem. It may be solved, for example,
by using the LLL algorithm to ﬁnd a short vector (λ0, . . . , λϕ(k)−1) in the lattice generated by
(r, 0, . . . , 0) and the (−qi−1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with 1 at position i for i = 2, . . . , ϕ(k).
Optimal twisted pairing In the presence of a twist of degree d such that k = de, a pairing can
be obtained in a similar fashion from λ = mr =
∑n
i=0 λiT
ei with n < ϕ(d). The only interesting
cases are d ∈ {3, 4, 6} with ϕ(d) = 2 (otherwise, we obtain again the twisted ate pairing). Then
eO′ : G1 ×G2 → µr, (P,Q) 7→
(
fλ0,P (Q)f
qe
λ1,P
(Q)vλ0P (Q)
)(qk−1)/r
deﬁnes a pairing, where (λ0, λ1) is a short vector in the lattice generated by (r, 0) and (−T e, 1).
2 Curves and associated optimal pairings
2.1 Curve selection
Pairing-based cryptographic settings should be designed so that the discrete logarithm problem
is intractable in each group involved. Current best attacks on a subgroup of prime order r
of an elliptic curve require on the order of
√
r operations. For the sake of eﬃciency of the
implementation and to save bandwidth in transmitting points on the curve, it would be desirable
that#E(Fq) = r ≈ q by Hasse’s theorem. This condition, however, is not easily met for arbitrary
embedding degree k, and the parameter ρ = log qlog r measures to which extent it is violated: Values
close to 1 would be optimal. Discrete logarithms in ﬁnite ﬁelds Fqk of large characteristic, which
we deal with in this article, may be computed by algorithms with subexponential complexity
Lqk(1/3) (as opposed to quasi-polynomial complexity in small characteristic [5]). One is thus
looking for parameter values such that
√
r ≈ Lqk(1/3) = Lrρk(1/3). Taking logarithms on both
sides shows that for bounded ρ, the embedding degree k grows asymptotically as log2 q.
3
Security log2 r log2 q
k Target kρ
128 256 3248 12.7
192 384 7936 20.7
256 512 15424 30.1
Table 1: Recommended curve sizes
Several studies have reﬁned this argument. Table 1 summarises security levels equivalent
to the AES secret key sizes, all given in bits, according to the Ecrypt2 recommendations [22],
validated by a large community of cryptologists.
For each security level, we have selected from [9] several curve families approximately fulﬁlling
the requirements on the parameter sizes, trying to stay as close as possible to the ideal kρ values.
These curves, together with their main parameters, are given in Table 2; for more details, see
Appendix A. The entries in column “construction” refer to the algorithms of [9]. Supersingular
curves are ruled out at these security levels by their too small embedding degree k ≤ 6, so we
restricted the search to ordinary curves. Since non-prime base ﬁelds Fq are virtually impossible
to reach, all curves are deﬁned over prime ﬁelds Fp. We favoured a small Hamming weight
of r and ﬁeld extensions Fpk which may be deﬁned by a binomial X
k − a with a small a ∈ Fp.
For comparison purposes, we also included the Barreto-Naehrig curves E12,2 and E12,3, widely
considered the best choice for 128 bit security due to their optimal value of ρ = 1, for security
levels of 192 and 256 bits by artiﬁcially increasing p. Some curve families are very sparse, which
forced us to relax the constraints, for instance for E25.
Security k ρ kρ Curve Construction deg q deg r deg t ϕ(k)
128 9 4/3 12.0 E9 6.6 8 6 4 6
11 6/5 13.2 E11 6.6 24 20 12 10
12 1 12 E12,1 6.8 4 4 2 4
192 12 1 12 E12,2 6.8 4 4 2 4
15 3/2 22.5 E15 6.6 12 8 6 8
16 5/4 20 E16 6.11 10 8 5 8
17 19/16 20.2 E17 6.2 38 32 2 16
18 4/3 24 E18 6.12 8 6 4 6
19 10/9 21.1 E19 6.6 40 36 20 18
256 12 1 12 E12,3 6.8 4 4 2 4
24 5/4 30 E24 6.6 10 8 1 8
25 13/10 32.5 E25 6.6 52 40 26 20
26 7/6 30.34 E26 6.6 28 24 14 12
27 10/9 30 E27 6.6 20 18 10 18
Table 2: Main curve parameters
2.2 Optimal pairings
Each curve family gives rise to diﬀerent optimal pairings, which are obtained via short vectors
in certain lattices as explained in §1.2. For each curve family in Table 2, such short vectors are
given in Table 11. Notice that for E17 and E24, the ate pairings are already optimal, and that
for d 6∈ {3, 4, 6} and moreover for E24, the twisted optimal pairings are exactly the twisted ate
pairings.
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3 The Miller loop
The procedure to evaluate the function fn,P is given by Miller in [17] and relies on the recursive
relations f1,P = 1 and
fn+m,P = fn,Pfm,P
ℓnP,mP
v(n+m)P
, (1)
which can be easily checked by taking divisors on both sides of the equality, see §1.1. This allows
to compute fx,P alongside xP in a standard double-and-add fashion, resulting in the special case
of Algorithm 1 in which all digits xi are 0 or 1. To avoid ﬁeld inversions, the numerator and the
denominator of the function are kept separate; the correctness of the algorithm may be derived
from the loop invariant fx′,P (Q) = f/g, where x
′ =
∑n−i−1
j=0 xi+j+12
j .
Algorithm 1: Miller’s algorithm using a NAF
Input: P 6= O, Q 6= λP , two points on an elliptic curve E over a ﬁeld
x =
∑n
i=0 xi2
i with xi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
Output: fx,P (Q)
R← P
f ← 1, g ← 1
for i← n− 1 downto 0 do
f ← f2ℓR,R(Q)
R← 2R
g ← g2vR(Q)
if xi = 1 then
f ← fℓR,P (Q)
R← R+ P
g ← gvR(Q)
if xi = −1 then
f ← fℓR,−P (Q)
R← R− P
g ← gvR(Q)vP (Q)
return f/g
Techniques for speeding up scalar products on elliptic curves may be adapted. For instance,
allowing addition-subtraction chains for computing xP , preferably by writing x in non-adjacent
form (NAF), in which no two consecutive digits are non-zero, results in Algorithm 1. Notice the
additional multiplication by vP in the case of a digit −1, due to f−1,P = 1/vP , which is often
incorrectly left out in the literature; in particular, [17, Algorithm 1] is only correct for addition
chains. The common omission may be explained by the use of denominator elimination: If k is
even and G2 = E(Fqk)∩ker(π− q), then the x-coordinates of P and Q and thus all values vR(Q)
lie in the subﬁeld Fqk/2 and disappear for reduced pairings involving a ﬁnal exponentiation. In
particular, g may be dropped completely.
An observation made in [7] allows to simplify the expression in the case xi = −1 also for
odd k. Denote by λ the slope of the line between R and −P . Then
ℓR,−P (Q) = y(Q) + y(P )− λ
(
x(Q)− x(P )),
which is computed with one multiplication, and f and g are updated with four multiplications
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altogether, or with two multiplications if denominator elimination applies. Then
ℓ′R,−P (Q) :=
ℓR,−P (Q)
vP (Q)
=
y(Q) + y(P )
x(Q)− x(P ) − λ (2)
is obtained without any multiplication since the ﬁrst term may be precomputed once and for all.
So replacing the block in the case of xi = −1 by
f ← fℓ′R,−P (Q), R← R− P, g ← gvR(Q)
reduces the number of multiplications to 2, the same as in the presence of denominator elimina-
tion.
Algorithm 2: Boxall et al.’s algorithm using a NAF
Input: P 6= O, Q 6= λP , two points on an elliptic curve E over a ﬁeld
x =
∑n
i=0 xi2
i with xi ∈ {−1, 0, 1}
Output: fx,P (Q)
h← n+#{xi|xi 6= 0}0≤i≤n − 1
δ ← (−1)h
g ← fδ,P (Q), where f1,P = 1 and f−1,P = 1/vP
f ← 1, R← P
for i← n− 1 downto 0 do
if δ = 1 then
f ← f2ℓR,R(Q) // f−2n,P = (f2n,P ℓ[n]P,[n]P )−1
g ← g2
R← 2R, δ ← −δ
if xi = 1 then // fn+1,P = (f−n,P f−1,P ℓ[−n]P,−P )
−1
g ← gℓ′−R,−P (Q)
R← R+ P, δ ← −δ
if xi = −1 then // fn−1,P = (fn,P ℓ[−n]P,P )−1
g ← gℓ−R,P (Q)
R← R− P, δ ← −δ
else
g ← g2ℓ−R,−R(Q) // f2n,P = (f2−n,P ℓ[−n]P,[−n]P )−1
f ← f2
R← 2R, δ ← −δ
if xi = 1 then // f−(n+1),P = (fn,P ℓ[n]P,P )
−1
f ← fℓR,P (Q)
R← R+ P, δ ← −δ
if xi = −1 then // f−(n−1),P = (fn,P f−1,P ℓ[n]P,−P )−1
f ← fℓ′R,−P (Q)
R← R− P, δ ← −δ
return f/g
In the same article [7], Boxall et al. introduce a variant of the algorithm based on
fn+m,P = (f−n,P f−m,P ℓ−nP,−mP )
−1,
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which contains only three factors instead of the four in (1), but requires a swap of the numerator
and the denominator for each doubling or adding on the elliptic curve. The algorithm of [7] is
given only for addition chains, but can be generalised to addition-subtraction chains, yielding
Algorithm 2. The correctness of the algorithm stems from the equations given in commentary
and (2), and the loop invariant fδx′,P (Q)
δ = f/g, where x′ =
∑n−i−1
j=0 xi+j+12
j. The value
of h is the total number of curve doublings, additions and subtractions carried out during the
algorithm; δ is +1 or −1, respectively, depending on whether the number of curve operations
still to be carried out is odd or even. In the end, δ = 1, and f/g is the desired result.
4 Final exponentiation
After the evaluation of a rational function, most pairings require a ﬁnal powering to obtain a
uniquely deﬁned result. It has been suggested that at high levels of security the ﬁnal exponen-
tiation would become so computationally expensive that the Weil pairing should be preferred
to the Tate pairing [16], but this conclusion was quickly contradicted by a ﬁner analysis of the
exponentiation step [11]. The rather special form of the exponent (qk − 1)/r makes the ﬁnal
powering less daunting than it may ﬁrst appear. This exponent can be decomposed into three
parts as follows. Let i be the smallest prime divisor of k.
qk − 1
r
= (qk/i − 1) · q
k − 1
(qk/i − 1)Φk(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
easy
· Φk(q)
r︸ ︷︷ ︸
hard
where Φk is the k-th cyclotomic polynomial. The ﬁrst two factors are sums of powers of q and are
easily computed using only a few applications of the Frobenius map x 7→ xq and multiplications
in GT , together with an extra division in GT for the ﬁrst part. Consequently, the powering by
N = Φk(q)/r, dubbed the “hard part”, is the only truly expensive step of the ﬁnal exponentiation.
It is usually carried out with multi-exponentiation techniques.
Generic exponentiation An algorithm proposed by Avanzi and Mihăilescu in [3] makes par-
ticularly intensive use of the Frobenius map, which is very eﬃcient for ﬁnite ﬁeld extensions given
by binomials, see Table 4. To compute bN , it ﬁrst decomposes N in base q, then each coeﬃcient
in base 2ℓ for a suitably chosen small ℓ, such that N =
∑⌈logq N⌉
i=0
∑⌈log
2ℓ
(q−1)⌉
j=0 nijq
i2jℓ, and
bN =
∏
j
(∏
i b
nijq
i
)2jℓ
. After precomputing all possible values of bnij with about 2ℓ multipli-
cations, for each j the inner product is evaluated in a Horner scheme; altogether, this requires
O((logN)/ℓ) Frobenius maps and as many multiplications. The outer product is then computed
by a square-and-multiply approach with O(log q) = O((logN)/k) multiplications, most of which
are squarings. Notice that for 2ℓ ∈ O(logN/ log logN) and k growing suﬃciently fast with re-
spect to N (which is the case due to the security equivalence of §2), the total complexity becomes
O(logN/ log logN) operations, which is sublinear in the bit size of N .
As can be seen in Table 4, the Frobenius is not completely negligible when the ﬁeld extension
is realised by a trinomial, so we investigated an alternative approach due to Nogami et al. [18],
which purportedly requires fewer applications of the Frobenius map. Let ℓ be an integer and
c = ⌈(logq N)/ℓ⌉, and let t = ⌈log2 q⌉. The algorithm of [18] creates a binary matrix with ℓ rows
and ct columns by ﬁrst writing N in basis qc. Each coeﬃcient corresponds to one row and is
decomposed into c coeﬃcients in base q, each of which is in turn written with t coeﬃcients in base
2. These form the columns of the matrix, organised into c blocks of t columns each. To compute
bN , ﬁrst the powers b2
i
are precomputed with t − 1 multiplications. If the same column occurs
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d ≥ 2 times in e ≤ c column blocks, its occurrences can be combined with d − 1 multiplications
and e − 1 applications of the Frobenius map. Taking into account that there are at most 2ℓ − 1
diﬀerent non-zero columns, this step can thus be carried out with at most ct− 1 multiplications
and (c− 1)(2ℓ − 1) Frobenius maps. Heuristically, a fraction of 1/2ℓ of the columns are zero, for
which there is nothing to do; so one expects a number of multiplications closer to ct(1 − 1/2ℓ),
a noticeable diﬀerence for small values of ℓ. For each row, the combined columns which have a
1 in this row need to be multiplied, with at most ℓ(2ℓ−1 − 1) multiplications. Finally, the rows
are combined with ℓ− 1 multiplications and ℓ− 1 Frobenius maps. We arrive at a complexity of
(c− 1)(2ℓ− 1)+ ℓ− 1 Frobenius maps and ct+ ℓ(2ℓ−1− 1)+ ℓ+ t− 3 multiplications. The latter
can be tightened heuristically by multiplying the ﬁrst term with 1 − 1/2ℓ, which turns out to
be close to the experimentally observed values. Asymptotically, the number of multiplications is
equivalent to (log2N)/ℓ+ ℓ2
ℓ. Recall from the security equivalence of §2 that k is of the order of
log2 q, so that c ∈ O ((logN)2/3/ℓ) and the number of Frobenius maps is in O (2ℓ(logN)2/3/ℓ).
Letting 2ℓ = (logN)1/3 yields a sublinear total complexity of O(logN/ log logN). The analysis
also shows that by preferring smaller values of ℓ, one may reduce the number of Frobenius maps
compared to Avanzi and Mihăilescu’s algorithm, at the price of more multiplications. Notice
that ℓ ﬁxes c, and that the exponentiality in ℓ implies that an optimal value is found easily in
practice.
Family-dependant exponentiation Scott et al. proposed in [21] an exponentiation tech-
nique for polynomial families of parameters q(x) and r(x). The exponent is written ﬁrst in base
q(x), then each coeﬃcient in base x as
N(x) = Φk(q(x))/r(x) =
∑⌊degN(x)/ deg q(x)⌋
i=0
∑deg q(x)−1
j=0 λi,jx
jq(x)i.
To obtain bN(x0), the values bx
j
0
qi are precomputed with ﬁrst deg q(x) exponentiations by x0,
which can be done with O(log q) multiplications, then about degN(x) applications of the Frobe-
nius map. The ﬁnal result is then obtained by multi-exponentiation with the exponents λi,j .
The exact complexity of this step depends on the length of an addition sequence passing through
all of the λi,j . If Λ = max |λi,j |, then the best rigorous bound currently available is log2 Λ +
degN(x)O(log Λ/ log log Λ), where degN(x) is the number of potentially diﬀerent values of λi,j ,
realised, for instance, by [24]. In practice, the coeﬃcients are small, and there are addition
sequences with only few additional terms, see Table 12, leading to a heuristic complexity of
O(degN(x)) multiplications. The total complexity then becomes O(log q + degN(x)) multipli-
cations and O(degN(x)) Frobenius maps, where degN(x) ≈ logN/ logx0.
5 Implementation
We have implemented the various pairings for the diﬀerent curves of §2 in the PARI library
and linked them into the free number theoretic computer algebra system GP [15]. Our aim
was not to provide an optimal ad hoc implementation for any one of the curves or pairings, but
rather to keep a suﬃcient level of genericity appropriate for a general purpose system, while still
implementing algorithmic optimisations that apply in a broader context. All benchmarks were
performed on a Macbook Pro with a 2.5 GHz Core 2 Duo processor, and timings are given in
milliseconds (rounded to two signiﬁcant digits).
5.1 Finite field arithmetic
Arithmetic in Fp is already available in PARI. The ﬁeld extensions Fpk are deﬁned by binomials
Xk − a for all curves but E11, E19 and E25, for which only trinomials of the form Xk +X + a
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exist. A deﬁning binomial can be found if and only if all prime factors of k divide p − 1, and,
additionally for 4 | k, if p ≡ 1 (mod 4) [19, Theorem 2], which happens quite often in our
context where k has only few prime factors and there is a certain freedom in the choice of p. Fast
reduction modulo binomials and trinomials had to be added to PARI. Deﬁnition by a binomial
is crucial for an eﬃcient pairing implementation, see Table 3, which shows the eﬀect for the ate
pairing on E18 when artiﬁcially switching to a trinomial.
Deﬁning polynomial unreduced ate unreduced optimal
x18 + x+ 6 490 ms 120 ms
x18 + 19 150 ms 35 ms
Table 3: Timings for ate pairing depending on the ﬁnite ﬁeld deﬁning polynomial
In several places in the literature, it is suggested to build Fpk by successive extensions of
degree dividing k, in particular of degree 2 or 3. It is unclear where the beneﬁts of this strategy
lie for multiplication: Virtually the same eﬀect may be reached by using Karatsuba (degree 2) and
Toom-Cook (degree 3) for polynomial arithmetic, which moreover speeds up the computations
also when k is not a power product of 2 and 3. By keeping a single extension, it is also easier
to reach the thresholds for asymptotically fast algorithms. In particular, PARI uses Kronecker
substitution to replace the product of polynomials by that of large integers which is outsourced to
the GMP library [12]; in experiments, this turned out to be faster than Karatsuba multiplication.
Note that using a binomial to deﬁne the ﬁeld extensions also indirectly speeds up the
arithmetic when ﬁeld elements lie in subﬁelds of Fqk , which happens systematically for the
group G2 = E[r] ∩ ker(π − q) in the presence of twists. As an example consider again the
curve E18. Let D ∈ Fp3 be a quadratic and a cubic non-residue in Fp3 , which implies that
Fp18 = Fp3 [D
1/6]. Then E18: y
2 = x3 + b admits a sextic twist E′ : y2 = x3 + b/D, explic-
itly given by φ6 : E
′(F3) → E(F18) : (x, y) 7→
(
3
√
Dx,
√
Dy
)
, which yields an isomorphism
of E′(Fp3)[r] with G2. If F18 is deﬁned by a binomial X
18 + A, then D = A1/3 = X6,
the elements of Fp3 are written as a12X
12 + a6X
6 + a0, and an element Q of G2 is given as
φ6(Q
′) = (a14X
14 + a8X
8 + a2X
2, a15X
15 + a9X
9 + a3X
3) with all ai ∈ Fp. These sparse poly-
nomials lead to a faster arithmetic, and part of the speed gains for binomial ﬁeld extensions as
shown in Table 3 may be attributed to this implicit handling of subﬁelds.
Explicit towers of ﬁnite ﬁelds could be useful for realising the Frobenius automorphism of
Fpk/Fp, since the non-trivial automorphism of a quadratic extension is a simple sign ﬂip; while
those of cubic extensions require a multiplication in the smaller ﬁeld anyway. We chose instead to
implement the Frobenius, as well as its powers, as linear maps by multiplying with precomputed
k × k matrices. We originally intended to study the use of optimal normal bases of Fpk/Fp,
in which the Frobenius π is realised as a simple permutation of the coordinates. It turns out,
however, that again binomial ﬁeld extensions yield an eﬃcient arithmetic: In their presence, the
matrix of π is the product of a diagonal matrix and a permutation, so π and its powers can be
computed with k multiplications in Fp [4, Theorem 3]. In the trinomial case, the Frobenius is
computed with close to k2 multiplications in Fp.
Table 4 summarises the relative costs of the Frobenius π, the multiplication M2 and the
inversion I2 in Fpk and the multiplication M1 and the inversion I1 in Fp. The eﬀect of a deﬁning
trinomial on the cost of π is clearly visible.
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E9 E11 E12,1 E12,2 E15 E16 E17 E18 E19 E12,3 E24 E25 E26 E27
M1/µs 0.41 0.36 0.27 0.82 0.64 0.57 0.66 0.64 0.49 2.2 0.74 0.83 0.73 0.64
I1/M1 11 11 15 12 13 14 12 12 13 10 13 12 12 13
M2/M1 55 90 110 80 120 130 130 140 170 70 250 210 250 240
I2/M2 8.0 7.9 8.6 8.1 8.1 8.7 9.2 8.8 8.7 8.1 9.2 9.5 10 10
π/M2 0.19 0.63 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.95 0.18 0.14 1.2 0.16 0.15
Table 4: Costs of arithmetic in ﬁnite prime and extension ﬁelds
5.2 Miller loop
Given the cost of inversion in Table 4, we implemented the elliptic curve arithmetic using aﬃne
coordinates. Timings for the Miller loop are summarised in Table 5. While mathematically not
necessary, the Tate and Weil pairings have also been restricted to the subgroups G1 and G2
of eigenvalue 1 and p, respectively, which assures a fairer comparison and incidentally a type 3
pairing in the notation of [10], see also [8]. For even embedding degree, we applied denominator
elimination. The ﬁrst row uses a double-and-add approach, the second one a signed NAF with
Algorithm 1. The variant of Algorithm 2 is only of interest when k is odd; we give its timings
with a double-and-add chain and a NAF in the third and fourth rows, respectively. It makes an
impressive diﬀerence.
Generically, one expects a NAF to save about 11% of the number of operations. For our
curves, the eﬀect is often much less. This can be explained by the sparsity of the integer r
derived from a curve family, which is thus closer to non-adjacent form than a random integer.
For instance, the binary decomposition of r for E12,1 has only 87 entries 1 out of 256, a density
that would be expected in a NAF of a random number. The NAF has 37 entries 1 and −1 each.
Also counting the squarings, the gain in the number of operations is less than 4%. One could
reduce the number of multiplications even further by combining with a sliding window technique;
since the number of squarings is unchanged, the eﬀect will be more and more marginal with an
increasing window size.
At these high security levels and consequently big values of k, the ate pairing eA is clearly in
general slower than the Tate pairing; the smaller multiplier is more than oﬀset by the need to
work over the extension ﬁeld. The only exception is E24 with a particularly small trace (t(x) of
degree 1 for r(x) of degree 8). In fact, the ate pairing for this curve is already optimal. As can be
expected, the twisted ate pairing eA′ is even less eﬃcient except for small values of k combined
with a high degree twist: The power of the trace T e = T k/d quickly exceeds r itself (in the table,
we computed with T e; one could reduce modulo r and arrive at the same timings as the Tate
pairing, but may then as well stick with the original). The optimal versions indeed keep their
promises. Due to the overhead of computing several functions, the total running time is not
reduced by a factor of ϕ(k), but the optimal ate pairing is generally faster than the Tate pairing.
Twisted pairings are asymptotically slower, but interesting for the medium values of k = 9, 12
or 16 which admit a twist of (relatively) high degree 3, 6 or 4.
The Weil pairing with its two function evaluations could be expected to behave like a Tate
followed by an ate pairing; due to the diﬀerent loop lengths, the part fr,Q(P ), however, has a
complexity closer to deg r(x)/ deg t(x) times that of ate, as can be roughly veriﬁed in the table.
As already stated in the literature, the enormous overhead of the Weil pairing is not oﬀset by
saving the ﬁnal exponentiation, see §5.3.
At higher security levels, odd values of k lead to a bigger ϕ(k) and thus a higher gain in
the optimal pairing; together with the Miller loop improvement of [7], odd and in particular
prime values of k become attractive. Notice that E11, E19 and E25 are heavily penalised by
the trinomial ﬁeld extension. Indeed, odd or, worse, prime values of k make the divisibility
conditions for the existence of a binomial extension harder to satisfy. Moreover, the degree of
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Curve eT eA′ eO′ eA eO eW deg q deg r deg t ϕ(k)
E9 31 64 15 50 14 100 8 6 4 6
29 59 15 45 14 97
21 46 11 46 12 85
20 42 11 42 12 80
E11 43 – – 110 20 230 24 20 12 10
39 – – 100 20 200 24 20 12 10
31 – – 100 20 200
28 – – 96 19 180
E12,1 14 13 7 18 9 70 4 4 2 4
14 13 7 18 9 67
E12,2 93 91 53 110 54 420 4 4 2 4
91 91 52 110 54 410
E15 130 520 73 270 44 460 12 8 6 8
130 480 71 240 41 440
90 360 53 240 41 370
88 330 50 220 37 360
E16 64 170 35 150 230 360 10 8 5 8
62 160 34 140 220 340
E17 160 – – 54 54 930 38 32 2 16
140 – – 50 50 820
110 – – 51 51 830
100 – – 47 47 740
E18 78 160 39 160 35 400 8 6 4 6
75 150 36 150 35 380
E19 130 – – 350 40 760 40 36 20 18
120 – – 320 35 680
93 – – 340 40 670
88 – – 300 34 610
E12,3 410 400 240 450 220 1800 4 4 2 4
400 400 240 450 230 1700
E24 190 88 88 55 55 960 10 8 1 8
180 85 85 56 56 900
E25 450 – – 1400 120 2700 52 40 26 20
410 – – 1300 130 2400
310 – – 1400 130 2400
300 – – 1200 120 2200
E26 210 – – 660 99 1600 28 24 14 12
190 – – 610 90 1400
E27 370 1900 190 570 54 1300 20 18 10 18
350 1800 180 510 53 1300
260 1300 130 530 52 1100
250 1200 130 450 47 1100
Table 5: Timings of the function evaluation in milliseconds
p(x) also grows with ϕ(k), so that the polynomial represents fewer numbers in the desired range
and leaves less choice for p or a value of x0 with low Hamming weight. Even if a binomial ﬁeld
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extension exists, odd values of k that are not divisible by 3 (in particular, prime k again) suﬀer
from a lack of twists and thus a less eﬃcient ﬁeld arithmetic as discussed in §5.1.
5.3 Final exponentiation
Timings for the ﬁnal exponentiation are compiled in Table 6.
Curve ϕ(k) Naive Hard naive AM04 NMKM08 SBCPK09
E9 6 56 36 15 15 8
E11 10 80 78 28 24 21
E12,1 4 58 17 8 8 4
E12,2 4 380 100 41 37 26
E15 8 490 250 85 110 50
E16 8 420 200 66 80 44
E17 16 580 550 180 200 110
E18 6 680 210 78 83 49
E19 18 460 460 150 110 83
E12,3 4 1800 470 170 170 120
E24 8 2000 640 150 200 97
E25 20 2600 2100 700 470 320
E26 12 2300 1000 240 270 170
E27 18 2100 1400 290 310 130
Table 6: Final exponentiation times in milliseconds
The ﬁrst column corresponds to a direct exponentiation by (qk − 1)/r via the sliding window
algorithm built into PARI. The second column does so for the hard part, while computing the
easy one using Frobenius maps. The next two columns relate the implementation of the hard
parts following [3] and [18]. At low security level, the diﬀerences between these two algorithms
are minimal. For the medium and high security range, our implementation conﬁrms the claim
of [18]: Their algorithm becomes faster when Frobenius maps are more expensive, as for the
three curves E11, E19 and E25. The k = 12 curves stand out: The low value of ϕ(k) makes the
ﬁnal exponentiation much easier with these two algorithms that rely on an expansion in base q.
While the theoretical analysis of §4 is not conclusive, the experiments are unequivocal: The
algorithm of [21] (which we used, as explained in the article, to potentially compute a small
power of the true pairing if the coeﬃcients of the polynomial contain denominators) is clearly
the fastest one for curves obtained from polynomial families.
6 Overall timings and conclusion
For each of our reference curves, Table 7 summarises the timings obtained for the fastest pairing.
Optimal pairings are indeed optimal for higher security levels. Their unreduced version
beneﬁts from high values of ϕ(k), as can be seen by comparing E24 and E27. However, part
of this advantage is oﬀset by the lack of denominator elimination for odd k, although Boxall et
al.’s variant almost closes the gap again. Moreover, the higher cost for the ﬁnal exponentiation
more than compensates the gain in the Miller loop. The decision which pairing to take then
also depends on the concrete cryptographic protocol: Not all of them require reduced pairings
throughout their execution. For instance, veriﬁcation protocols such as [6] make do with testing
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Security Curve ϕ(k) Pairing Unreduced Final exp Reduced
128 bit E9 6 eO′ 11 8 19
E11 10 eO 19 21 40
E12,1 4 eO′ 7 4 11
192 bit E12,2 4 eO′ 52 26 78
E15 8 eO 37 50 87
E16 8 eO′ 34 44 78
E17 16 eA = eO 47 110 157
E18 6 eO 35 49 84
E19 18 eO 34 83 120
256 bit E12,3 4 eO 220 120 340
E24 8 eA = eO 55 97 150
E25 20 eO 120 320 440
E26 12 eO 90 170 260
E27 18 eO 47 130 180
Table 7: Timings of the fastest reduced pairing variants
equality of products of several pairings. All of these may then be computed unreduced, and only
a ﬁnal quotient of products needs to be raised to the power, which makes this exponentiation
negliglible.
For a reduced pairing at lower security levels, Barreto–Naehrig curves with k = 12 remain
unbeaten, proﬁting from an exceptionally fast ﬁnal exponentiation.
At 192 bit security, Barreto–Naehrig curves need to work with a larger than optimal size of
the underlying elliptic curve, but still provide the fastest pairings. An equivalent performance,
however, may be reached for k = 16 with curve E16. The suboptimal ρ = 5/4 notwithstanding,
this curve is of size 501 bits instead of 663 bits for the Barreto–Naehrig curve, resulting in less
bandwidth for exchanging curve points. Thus our study shows that E16 is preferable at medium
security level.
At the highest AES equivalent of 256 bit, Barreto–Naehrig curves are no longer competitive
speed-wise. Here the curve E24 stands out. Although gaining only a factor of 8 in the Miller
loop length, it proﬁts from a very fast ﬁnal exponentiation, while even the unreduced variant
remains comparable to the closest competitor E27.
As becomes clear from this study, extension ﬁelds Fpk that do not allow a binomial as a
deﬁning polynomial are to be banned, see E11, E19 and E25.
Whether odd or even embedding degrees are preferable remains undecided. Our results seem
to indicate that odd degrees are slightly slower. This can be explained by their higher probability
of requiring a trinomial ﬁeld extension, sparser families and the lack of twists as explained at the
end of §5.2. Often, the gain odd and, in particular, prime embedding degrees provide through
larger values of ϕ(k) for the optimal pairings is more than oﬀset by an expensive ﬁnal exponen-
tiation, as is well illustrated by E17. In protocols that work with mostly unreduced pairings,
however, Boxall et al.’s variant of the Miller loop makes odd embedding degrees competitive, see
E15 and E27.
A deﬁnite conclusion is made diﬃcult by the lack of choice for any given security level: Some
families are so sparse that they contain no curves of prime cardinality in the desired range or, if
they do, no curves allowing to work with extension ﬁelds deﬁned by binomials. Even if suitable
curves exist, the sparsity of a family may have a big impact on the eﬃciency of the Miller loop.
Notice that the loop for E27 is more than twice shorter than that of E24. Nevertheless, the
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unreduced pairing is computed in almost the same time. This can be explained by the Hamming
weight of the multiplier: The family of E27 is instantiated with x0 of weight 13, that of E24 with
x0 of weight 7. So the search for new curve families remains a research topic of interest, not only
for families with optimal ρ, as witnessed by the good performance of E15 despite its very bad
ρ = 3/2.
A Curve parameters
Tables 8 to 10 give the exact parameters for the curves we studied for diﬀerent security levels.
The following notations are used: p(x), r(x) and t(x) are the polynomials representing the
cardinality of the ﬁnite prime ﬁeld Fq, a (large) prime factor of the curve cardinality and the
trace of Frobenius, respectively; x0 is the numeric value of the variable x; (a, b) gives the equation
of the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b; F is the irreducible polynomial deﬁning Fpk . For k = 16 or 17, no
prime values r(x0) exist in the desired range. We thus admit a small cofactor and let r0 denote
the actual large prime factor of r(x0).
Table 11 provides the short lattice vectors yielding our optimal ate pairings eO and optimal
twisted ate pairings eO′ , see §2.2.
Table 12 records the addition sequences used in the ﬁnal exponentiation of [21]. To remove
denominators, the power s of the original pairing is computed; n is the number of (not necessarily
distinct) non-zero coeﬃcients λij , see §4. The underlined terms are those that are added to
the sequence. As can be seen, there is in general a very small number of very small distinct
coeﬃcients, and only a tiny number of terms, if any, needs to be added.
E9 p(x) = (x
8 − x7 + x6 − x5 − 2x4 − x3 + x2 + 2x + 1)/3
r(x) = (x6 − x3 + 1)/3
t(x) = −x4 + x + 1
(a, b) = (0, 7) F (X) = X9 + 3 x0 = 43980465324080
E11 p(x) = (x
24 − x23 + x22 − x13 + 4x12 − x11 + x2 − x + 1)/3
r(x) = x20 + x19 − x17 − x16 + x14 + x13 − x11 − x10 − x9 + x7 + x6 − x4 − x3 + x + 1
t(x) = x12 + 1
(a, b) = (0, 4) F (X) = X11 +X + 11 x0 = 11210
E12,1 p(x) = 36x
4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x + 1
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x+ 1
t(x) = 6x2 + 1
(a, b) = (0, 5) F (X) = X12 + 5 x0 = 6917529027641094616
Table 8: Curves for security level 128 bit
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E15 p(x) = (x
12 − x11 + x10 − x7 − 2x6 − x5 + x2 + 2x + 1)/3
r(x) = x8 + x7 − x5 − x4 − x3 + x+ 1
t(x) = −x6 + x + 1
(a, b) = (0, 13) F (X) = X15 + 13 x0 = 271533021386417
E16 p(x) = (x
10 + 2x9 + 5x8 + 48x6 + 152x5 + 240x4 + 625x2 + 2398x + 3125)/980
r(x) = (x8 + 48x4 + 625) r0 = r(x0)/20641250
t(x) = (2x5 + 41x + 35)/35
(a, b) = (1, 0) F (X) = X16 + 2 x0 = 2251799888961585
E17 p(x) = (x
38 + 2x36 + x34 + x4 − 2x2 + 1)/4
r(x) = x32 − x30 + x28 − x26 + x24 − x22 + x20 − x18 + x16 − x14 + x12 − x10
+x8 − x6 + x4 − x2 + 1 r0 = r(x0)/12071636373225929
t(x) = −x2 + 1
(a, b) = (13, 0) F (X) = X17 + 2 x0 = 12681
E18 p(x) = (x
8 + 5x7 + 7x6 + 37x5 + 188x4 + 259x3 + 343x2 + 1763x + 2401)/21
r(x) = (x6 + 37x3 + 343)/343
t(x) = (x4 + 16x + 7)/7
(a, b) = (0, 19) F (X) = X18 + 19 x0 = 48422703193491756920
E19 p(x) = (x
40 − x39 + x38 − x21 − 2x20 − x19 + x2 + 2x + 1)/3
r(x) = x36 + x35 − x33 − x32 + x30 + x29 − x27 − x26 + x24 + x23 − x21 − x20 + x18
−x16 − x15 + x13 + x12 − x10 − x9 + x7 + x6 − x4 − x3 + x + 1
t(x) = −x20 + x + 1
(a, b) = (0, 9) F (X) = X19 +X + 23 x0 = 1274
E12,2 p(x) = 36x
4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x+ 1
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x + 1
t(x) = 6x2 + 1
(a, b) = (0, 13) F (X) = X12 + 5
x0 = 29230032746618058364073696654325660393118650866996
Table 9: Curves for security level 192 bit
E24 p(x) = (x
10 − 2x9 + x8 − x6 + 2x5 − x4 + x2 + x+ 1)/3
r(x) = x8 − x4 + 1
t(x) = x+ 1
(a, b) = (0, 1) F (X) = X24 + 19 x0 = 18446744073709602433
E25 p(x) = (x
52 − x51 + x50 − x27 − 2x26 − x25 + x2 + 2x + 1)/3
r(x) = x40 + x35 − x25 − x20 − x15 + x5 + 1
t(x) = −x26 + x + 1
(a, b) = (0, 31) F (X) = X25 +X + 19 x0 = 6995
E26 p(x) = (x
28 + x27 + x26 − x15 + 2x14 − x13 + x2 − 2x + 1)/3
r(x) = x24 + x23 − x21 − x20 + x18 + x17 − x15 − x14 + x12 − x10 − x9 + x7 + x6 − x4 − x3 + x + 1
t(x) = x14 − x + 1
(a, b) = (0, 12) F (X) = X26 + 4 x0 = 2685463
E27 p(x) = (x
20 − x19 + x18 − x11 − 2x10 − x9 + x2 + 2x + 1)/3
r(x) = (x18 − x9 + 1)/3
t(x) = −x10 + x + 1
(a, b) = (0, 9) F (X) = X27 + 3 x0 = 374298113
E12,3 p(x) = 36x
4 + 36x3 + 24x2 + 6x + 1
r(x) = 36x4 + 36x3 + 18x2 + 6x + 1
t(x) = 6x2 + 1
(a, b) = (0, 7) F (X) = X12 + 2
x0 = 934494328215398161047821996449179050138683228531035586851830703422221130029\
030240635045913079014
Table 10: Curves for security level 256 bit
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Curve Pairing Vector
E9 eO
(
1
3 (x− 2), 13 (x+ 1), 13 (x+ 1),− 13 (x+ 1),− 13 (x− 2),− 13 (x− 2)
)
eO′
(
1
3 (x
3 + 1), 13 (2 − x3)
)
E11 eO
(
x2,−x, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
E12,i eO (6x+ 2, 1,−1, 1)
eO′
(
2x+ 1, 6x2 + 2x
)
E15 eO (1, 0, 0, 0, x, 0, 0, 0)
eO′
(
x3 + x2 − 1, x4 + x3 − x− 1)
E16 eO ((2x− 15)/35,−(11x− 30)/35,−(2x− 1)/7, (x+ 10)/35,
(2x+ 5)/5, (8x+ 10)/35, (2x+ 6)/7, (17x+ 30)/35)), x = 25 mod 70
eO′
(
49x4/625, 7 + 168x4/625
)
E17 eO
(
x2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
E18 eO (1, 3x/7, 3x/7 + 1, 0,−2x/7,−2x/7− 1)
eO′
(
18(x/7)3 + 1,−(x/7)3)
E19 eO
(
x2,−x, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
E25 eO
(
x2,−x, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
E26 eO
(
x2, x, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
E27 eO (x, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
eO′
(
x9, 1
)
Table 11: Optimal pairings
Curve s n Addition sequence
E9 1 6 [1, 2, 3]
E11 3 10 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
E12,i 1 4 [1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 18, 30, 36]
E15 3 8 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
E16 857500 8 [1, 2, 4, 6, 10, 11, 15, 20, 22, 25, 29, 30, 40, 50, 54, 55, 75, 100, 125, 145,
220, 250, 272, 278, 300, 440, 585, 625, 875, 900, 950, 1025, 1100, 1172,
1226, 1280, 1372, 1390, 1750, 1779, 2290, 2780, 2925, 3000, 3300, 4250,
4375, 4704, 4750, 4850, 5125, 9700, 13000, 13250, 15000]
E17 4 16 [1, 2, 3, 5]
E18 1029 6 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 14, 15, 21, 25, 35, 49, 54, 61, 62, 70, 87, 98, 112, 131, 224,
245, 249, 273, 319, 343, 350, 364, 434, 450, 504, 581, 609, 784, 931, 1057,
1407, 1715, 1911, 2842, 4753, 4802, 6517]
E19 3 18 [1, 2, 3, 4]
E24 3 8 [1, 2, 3]
E25 3 20 [1, 2, 3]
E26 3 12 [1, 2, 3, 4]
E27 3 18 [1, 2, 3]
Table 12: Addition sequences
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